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WHEN THE LAW PRESERVES INJUSTICE: 
ISSUES RAISED BY A WRONGFUL 




What should an attorney do if he obtains information from a client that 
would help free an innocent man or woman from prison?  In all but one 
state, ethical rules require attorneys to keep such information confidential 
even as innocents remain locked away in prison.  This Comment proposes 
the introduction of a new exception to attorney-client confidentiality rules 
for wrongful incarcerations.  It begins by providing background 
information on attorney-client confidentiality, including lawyers’ duties to 
their clients and their ethical obligations under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  It then considers whether a new exception to 
attorney-client confidentiality would chill attorney-client discussions, and 
whether the reasonably certain death and substantial bodily harm exception 
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) should be interpreted 
to include an exception for wrongful incarcerations.  Practical issues 
associated with a new wrongful-incarceration exception are then analyzed, 
including the length of conviction after which an attorney would be 
required to disclose exonerating information; the proper timing 
procedurally for an attorney to come forward; the possibility that a 
wrongful incarceration exception violates a client’s constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination; and finally, the difference in attorney behavior 
that could be expected as a result of a wrongful incarceration exception.  
The Comment concludes by suggesting that a discretionary disclosure rule 
would best solve the issues presented by a wrongful incarceration exception 
to attorney-client confidentiality. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Brown 
University, 2003.  Many thanks to all who assisted me in completing this Comment.  
Tremendous thanks to my family and friends for all of their love and support, and my mom 
in particular, for suggesting this topic. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is built upon a foundation of liberty,1 a value that is 
reflected in nearly every facet of American law and culture.  Perhaps in part 
because of this fundamental value, the idea of wrongful incarcerations is 
particularly repugnant.  In the past several years, two wrongful 
incarceration cases have garnered especially heightened media attention.  
Both cases involved lawyers who were privy to information that would help 
free wrongfully incarcerated men, but were barred from coming forward 
because of confidentiality restraints associated with their relationships with 
their clients.  In other words, these lawyers were bound by the judicial 
system—a system Americans would like to believe secures liberty, justice, 
and freedom—from freeing innocent men from jail. 
In one case, two attorneys, Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, knew that 
their client, Andrew Wilson, had committed the murder for which another 
man, Alton Logan, was serving a life sentence.2  Wilson, who had 
confessed to the crime while Logan was being tried, was serving a lifetime 
sentence himself for two other murder convictions.3  Unsurprisingly, 
Wilson did not authorize his attorneys to disclose his incriminating 
confession, and so the attorneys were required under Illinois ethical rules to 
remain silent.4  In the face of this ethical quandary, the attorneys, along with 
Mark Miller, the attorney representing the alleged co-defendant in Logan’s 
case, signed an affidavit stating that they had information from privileged 
sources that Logan was not responsible for the murder.5  Wilson gave his 
attorneys permission to reveal the exonerating information in the event of 
his death.6  Twenty-six years later, after Logan had spent nearly half his life 
in jail, Andrew Wilson died, and the attorneys revealed Logan’s innocence.7  
Soon after, Logan was released from prison.8 
 
1 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2 Michael Miner, The Greater of Two Evils, CHI. READER, Jan. 31, 2008, at 6. 
3 Maurice Possley, Inmate’s Freedom May Hinge on Secret Kept for 26 Years, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 19, 2008, at 1. 
4 Helen Gunnarsson, The Conscience of a Lawyer: Your Client Admits He Committed 
Murder.  What Should You Do?  What Can You Do?  For Two Illinois Lawyers, These 
Aren’t Hypothetical Questions, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2008, at 118, 118. 
5 Id. 
6 Miner, supra note 2.  Wilson’s lawyers have claimed as much, although there is no 
written proof that Wilson gave permission.  See id. 
7 Innocent Man Free After 26 Years in Prison, CBS NEWS, Apr. 18, 2008, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/18/national/main4028780.shtml. 
8 Wendell Hutson, After 26 Years in Prison, Alton Logan’s Murder Charges Dismissed, 
CHI. DEFENDER ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.chicagodefender.com/article-1800-after-
26-years-in-prison-alton-loganrss-murder-charges-dismissed.html. 
2010] WHEN THE LAW PRESERVES INJUSTICE 279 
Similarly, Staple Hughes, a North Carolina lawyer, revealed his 
client’s confession in 2004, hoping to free Lee Wayne Hunt from his life 
sentence in prison.9  Hughes claimed that twenty-two years earlier, his now-
dead client confessed that he acted alone in committing a double murder for 
which another man, Lee Wayne Hunt, was serving a life sentence.10  
Hughes claimed that after his own imprisoned client died, he felt it was 
“ethically permissible and morally imperative” that he come forward with 
the exonerating information.11  The law, however, binds attorneys to remain 
silent even after their clients’ deaths,12 and Hughes did not receive his 
client’s consent to reveal the confidential information.13  Judge Jack 
Thompson of the Cumberland County Superior Court in Fayetteville 
refused to consider Hughes’ testimony during a hearing in 2007 in response 
to Hunt’s request for a new trial, claiming, “Mr. Hughes has committed 
professional misconduct.”14  Although Hughes was referred to the North 
Carolina Bar for violating attorney-client privilege, the complaint was 
dismissed in January 2008 in a confidential decision.15  Meanwhile, Lee 
Wayne Hunt remains in jail despite the apparently exonerating 
information.16 
The lawyers’ silence in the Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt cases 
produces a sense of outrage towards the ethical constructs that are meant to 
guide lawyers in the judicial system.  The decades-long prison terms of 
innocent men force us to question whether the ethical guidelines are ethical 
at all.  What kind of system allows a man to serve day after day in prison 
when lawyers know he is innocent?  When the moral premise of the judicial 
system is to establish justice, how can the same judicial system require a 
lawyer to remain silent as innocent men and women remain in jail unjustly? 
The answers, unfortunately, are more complicated than they seem.  
Although the end goal of the judicial system is certainly to produce justice, 
lawyers’ first obligations are almost always to their clients, in the hopes that 
the adversarial system will weed out the truth from fiction and ensure that 
justice is served.17  Thus, lawyers arguably represent a means to an end, and 
 
9 Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting A Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, Week 
in Review, at 4. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Swindler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998). 




17 Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (citing CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 
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the means require zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients,18 even in the 
extreme case of a wrongful conviction. 
However, every rule has exceptions, and attorney-client confidentiality 
is no different.  In certain situations, the law allows confidentiality to be 
broken in order to preserve an overriding value, such as the prevention of 
substantial bodily harm or reasonably certain death.19  Similarly, an 
exception for wrongful incarcerations could be promulgated as a declaration 
of society’s overriding interest in preventing innocent men and women 
from serving sentences.  However, in introducing such an exception, several 
issues are raised that are not immediately intuitive.  This Comment is an 
attempt to frame some of these concerns and shed light on the issues 
presented by a wrongful incarceration exception.  Although a wrongful 
incarceration exception risks chilling attorney-client discussions and raises 
a number of practical issues, such as when an attorney should disclose 
exonerating information and whether or not such a disclosure violates a 
client’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, this Comment 
argues that a rule allowing attorneys the discretion to come forward with 
confidences to help save the wrongfully convicted is worth the costs. 
Part II of this Comment begins by providing background information 
on the judicial system’s requirements of lawyers, including attorneys’ 
ultimate duty to their clients and their obligations under attorney-client 
confidentiality.  Part III proceeds with an analysis of the wrongful 
incarceration exception, with seven subparts.  Subpart A discusses the 
possible chilling effect of a new exception on attorney-client discussions.  
Subpart B considers the proposition that the substantial bodily harm and 
reasonably certain death exception should be interpreted to include an 
exception for wrongful incarcerations.  Subparts C, D, E, and F raise 
practical issues with a wrongful incarceration exception, including, 
respectively: the length of conviction after which an attorney would be 
required to disclose exonerating information; the proper timing 
procedurally for an attorney to come forward; the possibility that a 
wrongful incarceration exception violates a client’s constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination; and finally, the difference in attorney behavior 
that could be expected to result from a wrongful incarceration exception.  
Subpart G concludes by suggesting that a discretionary disclosure rule 
would best solve the issues presented by a wrongful incarceration exception 
to attorney-client confidentiality. 
 
(1908) (“The Lawyer owes ‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the 
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.’”)). 
18 Id. 
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  THE LAWYER’S DUTY 
A trial, the Supreme Court has asserted, is a “search for truth.”20  This 
assertion resonates easily with intuitive conceptions of what a judiciary is 
meant to establish.  Since justice is the prevailing goal of a judicial system, 
then truth, one would think, must be its unerring companion.  But, herein 
lies the paradox.  Although truth may be the end goal of every trial, the 
lawyers playing their parts serve a different end—advocacy on behalf of 
their clients—that may very well be at odds with the search for truth.  
Although such a conception of a lawyer’s duty may at first glance seem to 
conflict with the overlying goal of the judicial system—and in fact, in some 
situations it does—the American judicial system is built upon this 
fundamental premise in its pursuit of justice. 
The legal profession is guided by rules that recognize a lawyer’s duty 
as a “zealous advocate for the client, putting that person’s interest ahead of 
all others.”21  As far back as 1820, Lord Brougham famously described the 
role of the lawyer: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is the client.  To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others.  Separating the duty of a patriot from 
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be 
his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.22 
Aside from a few exceptions, the legal profession is built on a standard of 
strict attorney loyalty to the client.  In fact, despite the conundrum that 
lawyers face as being both advocates on behalf of their clients—clients who 
may have little to gain from the ascertainment of truth—and officers of the 
court “presumably working to advance the truth,”23 the ethical guidelines 
often require the lawyer’s duty to the client to be the lawyer’s ultimate 
obligation. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which is the 
ethical code upon which most states base their ethics guidelines for 
lawyerly conduct, do not once “directly reference truth in the provisions 
 
20 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986). 
21 Henning, supra note 17, at 210 (citing CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908)).  
22 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71-72 (3d 
ed. 2004) (citing LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821)). 
23 Henning, supra note 17, at 211. 
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that establish the precepts for the proper practice of law.”24  Devotion to the 
client, not truth, is the lawyer’s ultimate duty.  Although 
certain rules discuss the requirement that lawyers not introduce false evidence, 
mislead a third person, or act deceptively or fraudulently . . . nowhere do they instruct 
a lawyer—even on representing a client in an adjudicatory proceeding—to ensure that 
the result of the legal representation reflects what actually happened in the transaction 
that is the substance of the dispute.25 
In fact, the Model Rules go so far as to require the lawyer to cross-examine 
a witness, in an effort to undermine her credibility, even if the lawyer 
knows the witness is truthful.26  Similarly, a criminal defense attorney’s 
mission is to defend a guilty client, even when that defense results in the 
client’s acquittal.27  Such advocacy can hardly be framed as a “search for 
truth” and may, at times, conflict with the ascertainment of justice.  But our 
judicial system is built on the notion that a lawyer is a client’s 
representative, and together the lawyer and client should create the most 
powerful and rigorous defense possible on behalf of the client.28 
B.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
Attorney-client confidentiality has a long history in the American legal 
system and was recognized at least by the middle of the nineteenth century 
as an ethical mandate.29  A lawyer’s relationship with his client, both as a 
zealous advocate and as a gatekeeper of his client’s secrets, has been and 
continues to be one of the most sacred and protected relationships in the 
law. 
Client confidentiality has both evidentiary and ethical components.  
The attorney-client privilege, which is the evidentiary doctrine, is the oldest 
common law privilege of the various confidential communications.30  The 
privilege is premised on the theory that the “public benefit in encouraging 
clients to fully communicate with their attorneys in order to enable the 
attorney to act most effectively, justly and expeditiously in providing sound 
legal advice, outweighs the harm caused by the loss of relevant 
 
24 Id. at 213. 
25 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1, 8.4(c) (2008)). 
26 See id. at 217. 
27 Id. at 213. 
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3, for more information about the 
lawyer’s role under the Model Rules. 
29 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 130 (citing L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and 
the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 938 (1980)). 
30 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§18.03[1] (8th ed. 2007). 
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information.”31  Proposed Rule of Evidence 503 (also known as Supreme 
Court Standard 503), which is commonly used as a guide to attorney-client 
privilege in federal courts,32 states that “a client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client.”33 
The ethical component of attorney-client confidentiality, for the most 
part, expands on this concept.  The Model Rules require a lawyer not to 
reveal “information relating to the representation of a client.”34  Thus, the 
ethical guidelines require the attorney to keep a wider arena of information 
confidential—any information “relating” to the attorney’s representation—
while the attorney-client privilege prevents the attorney from disclosing any 
information “made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client.”35 
One of the main guiding principles behind the confidentiality doctrine 
is the notion that each member of our society is entitled to the free exercise 
of his or her autonomy.36  To that end, each person is “entitled to know his 
rights with respect to society and other individuals, and to decide whether to 
seek fulfillment of those rights through the due processes of law.”37  
Because lawyers have a “legal and practical monopoly over access to the 
legal system and knowledge about the law,” their “advice and assistance are 
often indispensable” to the effective exercise of individual autonomy.38  
Competent representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all 
the facts of the matter he is handling.”39  Since clients are not likely to give 
full, candid, and possibly incriminating or embarrassing facts to their 
lawyers unless they are confident that the lawyer will keep the information 
confidential, attorney-client confidentiality is essential for the effective 
 
31 Id.; see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.  The 
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such 
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”). 
32 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 30, at §18.03[1]. 
33 PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(b), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972). 
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008). 
35  Id.; PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(b). 
36 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 62. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 129. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981)). 
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assistance of counsel.40  In fact, the Supreme Court has asserted that the 
attorney-client privilege survives even after the death of a client.41 
Despite the benefits of confidentiality, it can produce some friction 
with the search for truth.  As one court put it, “Because ‘the attorney-client 
privilege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or fact-
finding process, it creates an inherent tension with society’s need for full 
and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during implementation of 
the judicial process.’”42  But courts have acknowledged that this “is the 
price that society must pay for the availability of justice to every citizen, 
which is the value that the privilege is designed to secure.”43  The “social 
good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers 
acting for their clients . . . outweighs the harm that may come from the 
suppression of the evidence.”44 
Although confidentiality is generally upheld, the ethical guidelines 
have recognized a few exceptions to the attorney-client confidentiality 
doctrine.  Model Rule 1.6 outlines six such exceptions, including exceptions 
to “prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm”45 and to 
“prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another.”46  The Model Rules, however, do not currently have 
an exception for situations like Alton Logan’s and Lee Wayne Hunt’s, 
when a lawyer knows and would like to disclose that his or her client 
committed a crime for which an innocent person is serving a sentence. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE IMPACT OF A NEW EXCEPTION ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
DISCUSSIONS 
In light of the long history and tradition supporting attorney-client 
confidentiality, one of the gravest problems with introducing a new 
exception to attorney-client confidentiality is that it would prevent the frank 
and candid discussions that are the very purpose of the confidentiality 
doctrine.  Confidentiality proponents “contend that confidentiality 
exceptions will interfere with the development of client trust and will 
 
40 Id. (citing Linton v. Perrini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
41 See Swindler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998). 
42 In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 482 (1990) (quoting In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 502 (1985)). 
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). 
46 Id. R. 1.6(b)(3). 
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discourage clients from using or freely communicating with their 
counsel.”47  Moreover, creating a new exception, which would allow 
attorneys to reveal client confidences, “puts the profession on a slippery 
slope of having to be the judge of which confidences are to be revealed and 
which are not.”48  As lawyers increasingly assume the role of deciding when 
to make disclosures without judicial oversight or clear guidelines, lawyers 
may become more comfortable with disclosure.49  Such a fundamental shift 
in the direction of the profession could lead to ineffective representation, 
which would arguably violate a client’s rights to effective assistance of 
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.50 
Although longstanding conventional wisdom considers confidentiality 
essential to ensure full and candid disclosure of embarrassing and 
potentially incriminating truths from clients, this consensus is difficult to 
prove empirically.51  As Professors Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith 
posit, “How would one determine scientifically how many clients in fact 
gave sensitive information to their lawyers which they would not have 
given but for assurance of confidentiality?”52 
Without scientific proof of confidentiality’s effects, many have 
doubted whether confidentiality is necessary to enhance client discussions.  
For example, Professor Harry Subin contends that if an attorney explains to 
his client that the best way to advocate on his behalf requires him to know 
all of the facts involved in the case, regardless of confidentiality, she is 
“likely to induce the client to disclose them, for nondisclosure jeopardizes 
the client’s goals.”53  Professor Lloyd Snyder adds that “clients will distort 
facts and withhold information from their lawyers no matter how strict or 
loose the rules of confidentiality may be.”54  Then again, clients may speak 
candidly for a number of reasons, including, for example, an “urge to 
cleanse oneself through confession,” or because of “some subconscious 
desire to seek help,” or “the conclusion that one cannot obtain help 
otherwise”—forces that operate regardless of a confidentiality rule.55 
 
47 Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients 
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 97 (1994). 
48 Kathryn W. Tate, The Hypothetical as a Tool for Teaching the Lawyer’s Duty of 
Confidentiality, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1659, 1683 (1996). 
49 Id. 
50 Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent 
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1127 (1985). 
51 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 139. 
52 Id. 
53 Subin, supra note 50, at 1163. 
54 Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 477, 485 (2002). 
55 Subin, supra note 50, at 1164. 
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According to Professor Snyder, “[c]onfidentiality rules can be an 
inducement to clients to be forthcoming with their lawyers only if they are 
aware of and understand the rules.”56  Since most clients do not know or 
comprehend the rules, or the complexity of the exceptions, any exceptions 
to the confidentiality rule are unlikely to affect legal assistance.57  Thus, the 
promise of absolute secrecy is not necessary in order to promote open 
discussion between clients and attorneys.58 
In response to such criticism, many studies have tested the effect of 
confidentiality on frank and candid discussion of respondents.  For 
example, one behavioral study found that respondents were five times more 
likely to admit to corporal punishment of their children when 
confidentiality was clear.59  Similarly, another study conducted by 
behavioral scientists revealed that respondents were twice as likely to admit 
to undesirable behavior, like illicit drug use, racist attitudes, and racist 
behavior, when the methodology assured confidentiality.60  A study by the 
Yale Law Journal suggested that more than 50% of lay people surveyed 
believed that they would be less likely to make free and complete disclosure 
to a lawyer if their lawyer was legally obligated to disclose client 
information to another lawyer in court.61  A survey of New Jersey lawyers 
conducted by Professor Leslie Levin found that over 65% of lawyers 
surveyed informed none of their clients about an attorney’s obligation under 
New Jersey ethical rules to disclose client confidences to prevent a client 
from committing a wrongful act.62  The reason most lawyers did not discuss 
the subject of mandatory disclosure, was “because they [felt] that 
discussions about confidentiality exceptions would interfere with client 
trust.”63  The violation of such trust led lawyers to believe they would 
obtain less than full disclosure from their clients if they promised anything 
less than complete confidentiality.64  Although the studies did not test the 
impact of a discretionary disclosure rule on client discussions, they suggest 
that clients are less likely to make full and complete disclosure when 
something less than complete confidentiality is promised. 
 
56 Snyder, supra note 54, at 505. 
57 Id. at 505. 
58 Id. at 484. 
59 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 140 (citing ROBERT F. BORUCH & JOE S. CECIL, 
ASSURING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH DATA 70 (1979)). 
60 Id. (citing BORUCH & CECIL, supra note 59, at 71). 
61 Notes & Comments, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other 
Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 
1226, 1262 (1962). 
62 Levin, supra note 47, at 120-22. 
63 Id. at 122. 
64 Id. at 122-23. 
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Professor Leslie Levin’s study nonetheless confirmed some of 
Professor Snyder’s reservations that clients are unaware of the complexity 
of the confidentiality rules.  Levin’s study found that most New Jersey 
lawyers did not believe that their clients understood that attorneys may be 
required to disclose client confidences in certain circumstances.65  A study 
conducted in Tompkins County, New York, revealed that 42% of all clients 
surveyed believed that confidentiality requirements are absolute.66  Despite 
clients’ incomplete understanding of the ethical rules, Professor Levin’s 
study suggested that lawyers believe confidentiality works to promote the 
free flow of client information.67  In other words, even though clients may 
not comprehend the nuances of the confidentiality rules, they still rely on 
their attorneys’ assurances that their communications are confidential to 
reveal embarrassing or incriminating information. 
Professor Levin’s study also found that discussing disclosure 
requirements with a client at the first substantive meeting or when the 
lawyer thinks the client might be about to discuss future wrongdoing may 
reduce “the likelihood that clients will say any more about the subject.”68  
Although warning clients about disclosure requirements “unquestionably 
promotes client autonomy” (since clients are entitled to know what is not 
protected before they speak), it leads to inhibited discussion, and a 
reluctance to speak any further.69  This is particularly disconcerting when 
considering the Fifth Amendment rights involved, which require the 
attorney to fully explain any adverse consequences of disclosure and the 
client to voluntarily waive the privilege prior to any self-incriminating 
confession if such confession is ever used in court.70  Warned as such, a 
client may decide to keep any incriminating information to himself, even if 
he is responsible for a crime for which an innocent person is being 
punished.71 
If one assumes that clients would withhold information from their 
attorneys because of a wrongful incarceration exception to the 
confidentiality rules, the introduction of such an exception could in fact be 
 
65 Id. at 122. 
66 Id. at 103-04 (citing Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 
351, 379 (1989)). 
67 Id. at 122. 
68 Id. at 125. 
69 Id. 
70 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
71 If, however, the client was never forewarned, or did not waive the attorney-client 
privilege, then any incriminating information could be protected under use immunity.  See 
id.  This could very well provide a perverse incentive for the attorney not to explain the 
consequences of any incriminating discussions, in the hopes that doing so would save his 
client from punishment under use immunity. 
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self-defeating.  As Professors Freedman and Smith note, “Certainly it is 
correct to say that lawyers know a good deal of truth.  They do so, however, 
because clients feel secure in entrusting their lawyers with damaging 
truths.”72  The problem is that it is hard to determine just how such an 
exception would actually affect discussions.  If the wrongful incarceration 
exception would affect many cases, or a few prominent ones, then word of 
mouth could travel widely, and attorney-client trust could erode over time.  
On the other hand, if an exception would affect a small number of cases, 
and clients remained unaware of the exception, then perhaps it would not 
make much difference at all.  Still, relying on the ignorance of clients and 
attorneys’ lack of disclosure of confidentiality exceptions to argue that a 
new exception would not impact candid attorney-client discussions seems 
perverse. 
Given the uncertainty and controversy over confidentiality’s precise 
impact on client discussions, the ultimate impact of a wrongful 
incarceration exception on client discussions may simply be unquantifiable.  
Ultimately, the promulgation of a new rule would require lawmakers to 
decide that the benefits of freeing wrongfully incarcerated men and women 
are worth the possible chilling effects caused by creating such a rule.  
Although a new rule could prevent attorneys from receiving the crucial 
information that would put them in a position to disclose wrongful 
incarcerations, it would afford them the opportunity to do something if they 
are in receipt of such information. 
B.  MODEL RULE 1.6(B)(1)’S “REASONABLY CERTAIN DEATH OR 
SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM” EXCEPTION 
AND WRONGFUL INCARCERATION 
Perhaps one of the most powerful arguments in favor of an attorney’s 
right to reveal confidential information about a wrongful incarceration is 
that Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)’s exception to prevent “reasonably certain death 
or substantial bodily harm” already encapsulates such a right.73  In a recent 
essay, Professor Colin Miller argues that the twenty-six states that have 
adopted some form of 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) “can and should read an implied wrongful 
incarceration/execution exception into their existing rules.”74  The twenty-
three states without such a rule should adopt some form of Model Rule 
 
72 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 138. 
73 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). 
74 Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful 
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 391, 393 (2008). 
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1.6(b)(1), and read a wrongful incarceration/execution exception into the 
rule.75  One state, Massachusetts, already has a provision under 
Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) that explicitly 
permits attorneys to disclose client information to “prevent the wrongful 
execution or incarceration of another.”76 
Professor Miller argues that incarceration can be analogized to 
substantial bodily harm for three reasons.  First, compared to the non-
incarcerated, “inmates face an increased risk of physical violence based 
upon factors such as the concentration of violent individuals, overcrowding, 
prison culture, the inability of prisoners to physically separate themselves, 
the prevalence of drug use, and prison guard brutality.”77  One national 
study cited by Miller indicated that 27% of inmates will suffer from a 
physically violent attack, excluding rape, at some point in their 
imprisonment.78  Miller also notes that studies which estimate the amount of 
violence in prisons are likely to underestimate the problem since inmates 
are reluctant to snitch and generally fear retaliation.79 
Second, Miller argues that inmates experience heightened risks of 
communicable diseases compared to the general population, perhaps 
because of “prison overcrowding . . . poor medical screening[,] and 
treatment in prisons.”80  The statistics, Miller argues, prove it: “According 
to a 2002 study by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, 
the rates of HIV and Hepatitis C infections in prisons are more than five 
times and between nine and ten times the corresponding rates in the general 
population, respectively.”81  Third, inmates are subjected to an increased 
risk of rape. 82  Miller points to a study reporting that 98% of inmates 
surveyed were aware of at least one sexual assault occurring in the previous 
year.83  Additionally, Miller asserts that the states whose rules allow 
attorneys to disclose client information to prevent substantial injury to the 
financial interest of another can include the significant financial effects of 
imprisonment as part of the harm to be prevented by a wrongful 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (citing MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008)). 
77 Id. at 397. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (citing Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for 
Punishment, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 462. n.126 (1993)). 
80 Id. at 397 (citing Potts, supra note 79, at 465-70). 
81 Id. (citing 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-
TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 (2002), available at 
http://www.ncchc.org/ 
stbr/Volume1/Health%20Status%20(vol%201).pdf). 
82 Id. at 398 (citing Potts, supra note 79, at 471 n.185). 
83 Id.  
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incarceration/ 
execution exception.84 
Miller argues that because the risk of suffering from substantial bodily 
harm in prison is commensurate with the risks faced by intended victims in 
situations where we already permit Rule 1.6(b)(1) disclosures, lawyers 
should be just as able to come forward under the current exception to 
prevent an intended victim from suffering as they would for an innocent 
person’s wrongful incarceration.85  Miller’s argument is compelling 
particularly when considering the real dangers presented by incarceration.  
However, he overlooks some holes in the substantial bodily harm exception 
that would likely present problems for attorneys hoping to disclose 
information about wrongful incarcerations.  Moreover, the rule, as 
constructed, does not reflect the full spectrum of values and rights that a 
specific wrongful incarceration exception should aim to uphold. 
To begin, Miller’s argument depends on prison statistics indicating 
that incarceration presents heightened exposure to bodily harm.  Although 
prisons today certainly include high risks of violence and disease, and this 
Comment does not intend to minimize the real-world danger of such risks, 
assume for a moment that prison did not involve a greater risk of harm than 
a non-incarcerated life.  Still, inmates would be confined to prison cells, day 
after day, drudging through the monotony of an imprisoned life.  As 
inmates, they would not have regular access to their families, and, as often 
happens, hundreds of miles would separate them from loved ones.  
Moreover, they would lead a depersonalized existence with little privacy, as 
passersby could gaze into their cells to watch them eat, sleep, or use the 
toilet.86  Although they would be subjected to no more or less of a risk of 
substantial bodily harm than the average American citizen, the constricted 
lifestyle, the monotony, and the lack of opportunity to establish careers, 
relationships, and hobbies would detract from their quality of life. 
Under such conditions, an attorney would not be able to come forward 
with information that would help exonerate an innocent inmate under 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1).  Since the inmate was not exposed to substantial 
bodily harm, there would be no current rule that could save him.  Thus, an 
inmate like Alton Logan could spend twenty-six years in prison while an 
 
84 Id. at 398-99 (citing Burden of Innocence Frequently Asked Questions, FRONTLINE, 
May 1, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/etc/faqsreal.html (“Studies 
by the Life After Exoneration Project found that over 90 percent of exonerees lost all their 
assets—savings, vehicles, houses—while imprisoned.”)). 
85 Id. at 398. 
86 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 68 (8th ed. 2007) 
(citing Richard A. Wright, Prisons: Prisoners, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1182 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002)). 
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attorney would be obligated to remain quiet.  This hypothetical, though 
extreme, illustrates a shortcoming in focusing only on the bodily harm 
involved in imprisonment.  It is not only that prisoners are exposed to 
substantial bodily harm, but also that they are limited from experiencing the 
freedom and autonomy that a wrongful incarceration exception should seek 
to protect. 
Second, in arguing that a wrongful incarceration exception should be 
read into the substantial bodily harm exception, Professor Miller incorrectly 
assumes that the risk of an inmate facing substantial bodily harm is 
commensurate with the risk a lawyer must analyze when determining 
whether his client will likely harm an intended victim.87  The difference 
between these two risks, however, is that in one scenario, the attorney has a 
direct relationship with the person aiming to do the harm—his client—and, 
therefore, has some direct understanding of the intended victim’s risk of 
harm.  In the other scenario, where an attorney seeks to free an innocent 
inmate, her only gauge of the inmate’s risk of harm is a set of prison 
statistics.  The attorney who believes her client intends to do harm can 
converse with her client, attempt to dissuade him from the planned 
wrongdoing, and measure the likelihood that harm will ensue without 
further intervention.  Under a wrongful incarceration situation, an attorney 
has none of these tools to assess the likelihood of harm. 
Despite these differences, Professor Miller argues that because lawyers 
frequently gauge their clients’ behavior incorrectly, the risks are 
commensurate.88  To support this conclusion, he cites a survey conducted 
by Leslie Levin in 1994 of a set of New Jersey lawyers where fifty-two out 
of the sixty-seven attorneys who believed that their clients were going to 
commit specific wrongful acts likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm had at least one client who did not ultimately commit the 
contemplated acts.89  However, Professor Miller failed to note that of those 
fifty-two lawyers, 61.5% believed that they were responsible for dissuading 
their clients from committing the wrongful act.90  These attorneys failed to 
come forward not because they incorrectly gauged their clients’ intentions, 
but because they understood their clients enough to dissuade them from 
doing harm, thereby preventing the wrongdoing altogether.  In fact, of the 
sixty-seven lawyers who believed that their clients were going to commit 
 
87 Miller, supra note 74, at 398. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (citing Levin, supra note 47, at 111-12, 114 n.145). 
90 Levin, supra note 47, at 119 nn.172-73 (“Twenty-eight out of 52 lawyers (53.3%) 
believed that they dissuaded their clients by using reasoning other than the threat to disclose.  
Another 7.7% thought that their clients did not commit the acts at least in part because the 
attorneys had threatened to disclose.”). 
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wrongful acts likely to result in future death or bodily injury, thirty-six had 
valid reasons to conclude that disclosure was not necessary to prevent the 
wrongful act.91  Only six lawyers reported that the wrongful acts did not 
occur because they were wrong about their client’s intentions or their client 
calmed down.92  Thus, Levin’s survey suggests that only 10% of lawyers 
miscalculate their clients’ intentions to do harm. 
The Comment to Model Rule 1.6 suggests that lawyers “may consider 
such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and 
with those who might be injured by the client, [and] the lawyer’s own 
involvement in the transaction”93 when exercising their discretion to come 
forward with confidential information under Model Rule 1.6(b).  Professor 
Miller, however, would require attorneys to come forward with evidence 
about a wrongful incarceration without any relationship with the actors 
(fellow prisoners or security guards) who would likely impose substantial 
bodily harm on the innocent inmate.  Professor Miller assumes that 
attorneys should come forward based strictly on nationwide statistics 
describing conditions of incarceration.  But, without performing any 
specific research on the conditions of an inmate’s imprisonment, an 
attorney could arguably never know with the “reasonabl[e] certain[ty]”94 
required under Model Rule 1.6(b) that disclosing the confidential 
information would prevent substantial bodily harm.  A wrongful 
incarceration exception to attorney-client confidentiality should not require 
an attorney to disclose only when they are reasonably certain that 
substantial bodily harm might ensue.  The exception should be provided for 
situations in which an innocent is in prison or facing prison time for a crime 
they did not commit, regardless of the bodily harm they may or may not 
suffer, or the attorney’s knowledge of such harm. 
Another shortcoming provided by reinterpreting the substantial bodily 
harm exception to include wrongful incarceration is that the wording of 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes no distinction between saving an innocent or a 
guilty person from suffering substantial bodily harm.95  In fact, by freeing 
one inmate from suffering bodily harm in prison, an attorney places another 
person, his own client, in the same conditions.  In some scenarios, an 
attorney’s disclosure could actually lead to his client’s receiving the death 
 
91 Id. at 128-29 n.211.  Thirty-two lawyers reported that they dissuaded their clients and 
four reported that the client had no opportunity to commit the act.  Id. 
92 Id. at 129 n.211.  It is unclear from the survey responses whether these lawyers 
reached this conclusion before the wrongful act was supposed to occur—in which case there 
was no duty to disclose—or afterwards.  Id. 
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2008). 
94 Id. R. 1.6(b)(1). 
95 See id. 
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penalty—a fate Dale Coventry, Andrew Wilson’s attorney in the Alton 
Logan case, feared for his client if he were to reveal his guilt.96  Although 
such punishment may be deserved, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes no such 
distinction.  By remaining silent, therefore, attorneys prevent their own 
clients from being exposed to the substantial bodily harm or reasonably 
certain death presented by incarceration—and since Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) 
seeks to prevent such harm without any limitation for the identity of the 
victim, one could argue that the attorney who remains silent in fact adheres 
to the principles propounded by the ethical rules. 
Finally, although Miller’s argument would present an easy solution to 
a complicated problem, it is simply impractical.97  Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), 
and its state statute counterparts, has been interpreted for years not to 
include a wrongful incarceration exception.  It is doubtful that Miller’s 
encouragement of a new interpretation would carry much weight, as judges 
would likely continue to read the rule consistently with its original 
meaning.98  Moreover, even if judges interpreted the bodily harm exception 
to include wrongful incarcerations, there may be situations where 
incarceration did not produce reasonable certainty of bodily harm, in which 
case, the exception would not help the innocent.  A new rule promulgated 
by the legislature would carry much more weight as a clear signal of a new 
intent to protect the wrongfully incarcerated specifically.  To the extent that 
Miller’s analysis suggests that states with bodily harm exception rules 
should more comfortably adopt a wrongful incarceration exception, 
recognizing some of the overlap in values protected in each, his arguments 
are instructive.  However, a better solution would be the enactment of a new 
and clear rule that would properly accommodate the host of issues 
presented by a wrongful incarceration exception to attorney-client 
confidentiality. 
C.  MINIMUM SENTENCE REQUIREMENTS 
In enacting a new rule, one of the practical issues presented by a 
possible wrongful incarceration exception is whether it should only apply 
when innocents have been sentenced to terms of a specified minimum 
number of years.  Alton Logan’s life sentence—and his twenty-six year 
imprisonment—is an extreme case for which many argue there was a moral 
mandate to come forward.  But what happens when an innocent inmate is 
sentenced to thirty days, or just one day?  Is the moral prerogative still just 
 
96 Miner, supra note 2. 
97 Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confidences: Punishing the Innocent, 61 
U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 208 (1990). 
98 Id.  
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as strong when the prison term is reduced?  If not, then at what point should 
lawyers come forward? 
Physical violence and rape can and do occur as soon as the first day of 
incarceration.99  As such, if the moral prerogative is to save an innocent 
person from substantial bodily harm—as the Model Rules currently 
suggest100 and Professor Miller strongly advocates—then an attorney should 
arguably be given the right to come forward with exculpatory evidence 
even for a single day of undeserved confinement.  Moreover, the social 
stigma, financial loss, and impingement on freedom associated with 
incarceration may be severe enough to warrant an attorney’s right to come 
forward with exonerating information for any length of wrongful 
confinement. 
Allowing an attorney the right to come forward to prevent an innocent 
person from serving any length of time in prison provides the attorney with 
the opportunity to properly weigh the issues presented by wrongful 
incarceration against a breach of confidentiality with his own client.  Any 
rule that sets a predetermined sentence requirement before allowing 
disclosure risks exposing innocent people to the hazards presented by 
incarceration.  Setting an arbitrary cut-off (for example, allowing 
disclosures only in the case of felony convictions) would impose unfair 
distinctions among innocent people serving time for offenses they did not 
commit.  Those serving shorter sentences would have no avenue for 
recourse in the law, even though they were equally innocent of a crime they 
did not commit. 
Certainly, allowing attorneys the right to come forward will not always 
translate into an attorney’s decision to come forward in those jurisdictions 
that adopt discretionary disclosure rules.  In extreme situations, where 
disclosing confidential information would save an innocent person from 
serving a year in prison but would land one’s client in prison for life,101 
many attorneys may decide to remain silent.  Even in less severe situations, 
attorneys may choose not to disclose confidential information, weighing 
 
99 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A 
youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his first night in jail, or, 
it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail.”); Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan, 
Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop 
for “Deliberate Indifference,” 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 153-54, 169-71 (2001) 
(citing Donna Brorby, Remarks at the “Not Part of the Penalty”: Ending Prisoner Rape 
Conference (Oct. 19, 2001)). 
100 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6. 
101 Such a scenario may be likely in a three-strikes rule state, where one additional felony 
conviction could land a client in jail for life while saving an innocent inmate without any 
prior convictions from serving just a year.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 
2009). 
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client confidentiality as the paramount value.  A discretionary rule would 
allow attorneys this right, providing them the flexibility to weigh the issues 
on each side and determine the best course of action.  Although a 
mandatory rule would ensure that the innocent were protected under any 
circumstances and would create consistency between cases, it would come 
at the expense of a client’s trust and attorney confidence.  The current 
exceptions to client confidentiality already indicate that such trust should 
not be easily discarded, affording attorneys the discretion to come forward 
even in cases where a victim may be the subject of substantial bodily 
harm.102  Such discretion is afforded because of the difficulty of the issues 
at stake, and the importance of confidentiality and candid discussion against 
nearly any value.  Similarly, a wrongful incarceration exception should 
afford attorneys the same opportunity, in recognition of the values involved 
in choosing either to disclose or to remain silent. 
D.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES: THE RIGHT TIME TO DISCLOSE 
In considering whether to disclose confidences about a wrongful 
incarceration, an attorney must consider the proper time within the judicial 
process to disclose the information.  Professor Miller asserts that attorneys 
should be able to disclose client information at some point during the 
pretrial period because of the large percentage of defendants detained even 
before trial begins.103  Since such detention risks exposure to substantial 
bodily harm, attorneys should be able to come forward before the trial has 
even begun based on the policies propounded by Model Rule 1.6(b)(1).  
Additionally, Miller asserts, assuming the large costs of litigation, those 
states that permit or require attorneys to disclose client information to 
prevent substantial injury to the financial interest of another should allow 
attorneys to come forward as early as the pretrial phase of the 
proceedings.104 
A mandatory disclosure rule that requires attorneys to immediately 
come forward with exonerating information could seriously hurt a client’s 
case.105  For example, in the midst of a trial in which an attorney’s own 
client is being tried, the immediate disclosure rule would require the 
attorney to disclose potentially damning confidential information about his 
 
102 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. 
103 Miller, supra note 74, at 398. 
104 Id. at 398-99. 
105 The mandatory death or substantial bodily harm disclosure rule is the minority rule, 
currently present in twelve states’ ethical codes: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  
Brooks Holland, Confidentiality and Candor Under the 2006 Washington Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 327, 344 (2008). 
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client in order to save an innocent co-defendant from serving any time in 
prison.  A rule that would require such disclosure could violate a client’s 
right against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, discussed in 
more detail in Part III.E. 
Under a discretionary rule, most attorneys would likely rather wait 
until the trial is over before coming forward with evidence, even if the 
innocent defendant was being detained pretrial.  By waiting, there is still 
some hope that justice will be served and the innocent defendant will only 
be temporarily detained.  Similarly, in cases where the client is not 
detained, but stands to spend a significant amount of money on litigation 
expenses, most lawyers would probably refrain from coming forward until 
the completion of the trial.  In fact, in situations where lawyers could 
prevent financial injury or property damage to another by disclosing client 
confidences, a study suggested that only 9% of lawyers chose to disclose.106  
Attorneys, it seems, are reluctant to break confidentiality with their clients 
in order to prevent financial injury, and there is no reason to believe that 
such reluctance would not also apply during pretrial proceedings, even 
when the large expense of litigation looms. 
Then again, despite attorneys’ reluctance to disclose information 
during or before trial, once an innocent defendant has been sentenced it can 
be quite difficult to appeal his conviction.  Most prosecutors “genuinely . . . 
believe in the guilt of persons that a jury has found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”107  Once a defendant is convicted, the presumption of 
innocence fades, and any protective posture the prosecutor might adopt 
towards a defendant pretrial disappears.108  Moreover, “[a]s a policy matter, 
the reopening of a closed . . . case invites public distrust of the accuracy of 
the criminal justice system.”109  New evidence “often lack[s] the ring of 
truth” and may be considered a last ditch effort on the part of the convict 
himself to avoid (continued) incarceration.110 
 
106 Levin, supra note 47, at 129-30.  New Jersey’s rule requires that an attorney reveal 
“such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client . . . from committing a criminal, illegal 
or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . . . substantial 
injury to the financial interest or property of another.”  N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(b)(1) (2009), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
rules/apprpc.htm. 
107 W. William Hodes, What Ought to Be Done—What Can Be Done—When the Wrong 
Person Is in Jail or About to Be Executed?  An Invitation to a Multi-Disciplined Inquiry, and 
a Detour About Law School Pedagogy, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1547, 1561-62 (1996). 
108 Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 171, 210 (2005). 
109 Id. at 174. 
110 Hodes, supra note 107, at 1562. 
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Presumably, defense attorneys understand the difficulty of introducing 
new information to exonerate a client.  Their reluctance to come forward 
early in a proceeding should be balanced with the difficulty in helping an 
innocent defendant once he or she has been convicted.  Ultimately, 
attorneys are in the best position to do such balancing since they have all 
the information in front of them.  Requiring disclosure at a certain point 
could either seriously jeopardize a client’s case or could greatly impede a 
postconviction actual innocence claim, depending on when the disclosure 
was made.  Attorneys should be given the discretion to weigh properly the 
concerns presented on each side of the timing decision.  Although this could 
present inconsistency amongst different cases, it is the only way of ensuring 
that proper consideration is given to the myriad values at stake. 
E.  SELF-INCRIMINATION AND USE IMMUNITY 
By breaking confidentiality and disclosing incriminating information 
about her client, an attorney arguably violates her client’s Fifth Amendment 
rights.  The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “prevents 
the use, in a criminal prosecution, of a defendant’s testimony elicited by 
compulsion.”111  In a wrongful incarceration scenario, the Fifth Amendment 
right is triggered not by a client’s compelled incriminating testimony, but 
by his attorney’s disclosure of confidential incriminating statements in a 
criminal prosecution against his client.  The reason the constitutional right 
is triggered is in part because a client who “makes an unwarned confession 
to . . . his lawyer is entitled to believe that he is speaking to someone who is 
acting ‘solely in his interest’ in a relationship of trust and confidence.”112  If 
an attorney then breaks that trust and reveals incriminating information 
about his client, the client’s personal privilege against self-incrimination is 
violated.  Moreover, a client is entitled to be free from being made “the 
deluded instrument[] of his own conviction.”113  An attorney who reveals 
incriminating, privileged information against his client’s will is 
incriminating him in a way that violates his constitutional rights. 
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized the 
relationship between the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination and the attorney-client privilege.114  The Supreme Court held 
that an attorney could not be compelled to break the attorney-client 
privilege and produce incriminating information about his client that would 
 
111 Subin, supra note 50, at 1120. 
112 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 190. 
113 Id. (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981)). 
114 425 U.S. 391 (1975). 
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violate his Fifth Amendment rights.115  The Court highlighted the 
importance and purpose of the attorney-client privilege to “encourage 
clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”116  Fisher established that 
if the information  
would have been protected by the Fifth Amendment in the hands of the clients, [it] 
must continue to be protected (by the attorney-client privilege) in the hands of the 
lawyer. . . .  [O]therwise[,] defendants would de facto lose whatever Fifth Amendment 
protection they originally had, as a “penalty” for communicating with their 
lawyers.117   
In order to avoid the Fifth Amendment constitutional violations 
triggered by an attorney’s disclosure of a wrongful incarceration, use 
immunity should be offered as a corollary right under a wrongful 
incarceration exception.  Use immunity, which protects clients from the use 
of compelled testimony (or any information derived from that testimony) in 
a future criminal prosecution,118 is provided in situations in which the 
overriding values of the public interest in criminal investigation require that 
an attorney disclose incriminating and privileged information.119  Use 
immunity would protect any incriminating information revealed by the 
attorney against his client’s wishes from being used against the client in a 
criminal prosecution.  Therefore, an attorney’s disclosure of a wrongful 
incarceration would help the innocent by providing exonerating 
information, while offering no new evidence against a client in a criminal 
prosecution against him.  Since the Fifth Amendment does not bar the 
revelation of incriminating testimony—it only prohibits using the 
information in a criminal prosecution—use immunity could effectively 
protect a client’s Fifth Amendment rights even if his attorney disclosed 
confidential, incriminating information.120  Additionally, in those situations 
where a client knowingly and voluntarily waived the attorney-client 
privilege, and granted his attorney permission to reveal confidences, there 
would be no Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore no need for use 
immunity’s protection. 
 
115 Id. at 403-05. 
116 Id. at 403. 
117 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 186 n.140 (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, 
JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.13 (Supp. II  2004)). 
118 Use immunity grants immunity from the “use of . . . compelled testimony (or any 
information derived from that testimony) in a future prosecution against [a] witness.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (8th ed. 2004). 
119 Subin, supra note 50, at 1123 (citing State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 
684 (Wash. 1964)). 
120 Id. at 1120-21. 
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In order to preserve a prosecution’s already existing case against a 
client, use immunity would only protect information that the attorney 
received from the client for legal assistance purposes and that the 
prosecution had not already acquired.  Any information that the prosecution 
gathered independently would be unprotected.  The prosecution could 
therefore bring a case against a guilty client if it could prove the case 
without using any immunized information.121  Thus, a case that was already 
being developed against a client need not suddenly be dropped when an 
attorney comes forward with a confession.  This tool would only be 
available in cases where the prosecution had already gathered sufficient 
evidence to prosecute, so that an attorney’s decision to disclose would not 
necessarily save a client who already feared prosecution.  
Use immunity would thus protect a client’s constitutional rights and 
would provide attorneys some comfort in deciding to disclose client 
confidences.  Such safety would not come without any expense.  Use 
immunity would grant guilty people a get out-of-jail-free card by 
potentially allowing self-confessing criminals to go unpunished for a crime 
they committed.  Such impunity would be a tough pill for victims and their 
family members to swallow, as they would have no way of seeking 
retribution in cases where only immunized information was available.  Most 
disturbingly, use immunity risks that guilty people with a propensity for 
crime will be free to commit crimes again.  Despite these serious 
drawbacks, use immunity may be the only option available under a 
wrongful incarceration exception that would avoid constitutional violations.  
Regardless of the form a wrongful-incarceration exception rule takes, use 
immunity is a necessary, if not perfect, safeguard to ensure a client’s 
constitutional rights are protected. 
F.  THE IMPACT OF A NEW RULE ON ATTORNEYS’ BEHAVIOR 
Although there are several concerns that would require consideration 
before introducing a new exception to attorney-client confidentiality, one of 
the main practical issues is whether it would ultimately make any difference 
in lawyers’ behavior.  Massachusetts is currently the only state that has a 
wrongful incarceration exception.  Comment 9A to the Massachusetts Rule 
explains that the exception “permits a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information in the specific situation where such information discloses that 
an innocent person has been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to 
imprisonment or execution.”122  As of the writing of this Comment, I could 
 
121 Id. at 1176-77. 
122 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) cmt. 9A (2008) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpcnet.htm. 
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find no reported instances of a lawyer making a disclosure under this rule.  
Although it is possible that there have been no cases to report, it might very 
well be that lawyers are choosing to remain silent despite the exception.  
Dale Coventry, for example, who remained silent for so many years while 
Logan served time in jail, explained his actions by reasoning that his 
ultimate obligation was to his client.123  Under a discretionary rule, it is 
questionable whether Coventry would have disclosed his client’s confession 
any earlier, since his client’s trust was his most important concern.  Such 
trust should not be undermined nor discounted, but ultimately, the lack of 
impact caused by a discretionary rule should be considered. 
There is some evidence that even a mandatory rule would not make 
much of a difference in lawyers’ behavior.124  According to Leslie Levin’s 
study of New Jersey lawyers, only about half of the lawyers who were 
required to disclose under New Jersey’s Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.6(b) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm actually made 
disclosures.125  Although lawyers offered a number of reasons for not 
disclosing client information to prevent harm to another, most of these 
reasons related to a basic disagreement with the disclosure rule.126  Also, the 
lawyers who did not disclose client information to prevent harm often 
indicated that they did not do so because of the perceived importance of 
maintaining client trust.127  For example, one public defender noted, “Once 
you lose your reputation for fighting for your client regardless of the 
information that you receive from him, it leaves you in a vulnerable 
position.”128  On the other hand, virtually all of the lawyers who came 
forward and disclosed client information to prevent substantial harm 
indicated they would have disclosed even if disclosure were optional under 
 
123 Dale Coventry, Remarks at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law Panel 
Discussion: 26 Years of Justice Denied: The Ethics of Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Wrongful Conviction of Alton Logan (Nov. 3, 2008) (on file with author).  
124 Whether an exception would in reality produce much benefit to the wrongfully 
accused or convicted, even if a lawyer did disclose confidential information, is another 
concern worth exploring.  In fact, “[i]f a lawyer were to reveal a deceased client’s confession 
to a crime for which another had been charged or convicted, there are a number of serious 
evidentiary barriers to the admission of such testimony in a court proceeding, including 
attorney-client privilege, the hearsay rule, and the alternate perpetrator doctrine.”  Peter A. 
Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful Incarceration,  CRIM. JUST., 
Summer 2008, at 46, 48.  Although I do not explore the evidentiary hurdles produced by a 
wrongful incarceration exception in this Comment, they are certainly worth considering 
when drafting a possible new exception. 
125 Levin, supra note 47, at 129. 
126 Id. at 132. 
127 Id. at 132-33. 
128 Id. at 133. 
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the New Jersey rule.129  Although the mandatory rule seemed to have some 
effect on attorneys, the primary reason lawyers came forward was concern 
for the intended victim.130  Taken together, it is questionable whether even a 
mandatory rule would result in changes in attorneys’ behavior: if lawyers 
disagree with the rules, then they may remain silent regardless. 
Part of the reason lawyers can remain silent despite mandatory rules is 
because it is nearly impossible to police their behavior.  If both a client and 
his attorney remain silent about a confession, then there is virtually no way 
to regulate the attorney’s conduct.  Under such conditions, attorneys may be 
more likely to behave according to what they believe is right or wrong, 
instead of what the ethical guidelines require.  In fact, Jamie Kunz, one of 
Andrew Wilson’s lawyers, claimed that if Alton Logan had faced the death 
chamber instead of life in prison, she would have come forward regardless 
of the statutory ethical rules.131  There is some evidence that clients, even 
those who understand confidentiality rules to be absolute, believe that their 
lawyers will behave according to their personal sense of what should be 
kept confidential.132  Finally, disciplinary committees presiding over such 
situations may not apply the ethical rules rigidly, understanding that certain 
situations deserve some leniency.133  For example, Dale Coventry and Jamie 
Kunz were never disciplined for coming forward with their confidential 
information, even though there was some question as to whether Andrew 
Wilson really gave them permission to disclose his confession upon his 
death.134  Similarly, although Staple Hughes was referred to the North 
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130 Id. 
131 Gunnarsson, supra note 4, at 119.  Illinois rules allow a lawyer to disclose 
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disclose confidential information that would save a defendant from execution, Professor 
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Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1611, 1627 (1996); see 
also, Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating Law 
Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1631, 1633 (1996); 
Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer’s Moral Duties with Life on the Line, 
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1641, 1654 (1996). 
134 Whether or not Wilson actually gave permission is based on the attorneys’ word.  
Miner, supra note 2.  The lawyers actually received permission from a judge before 
revealing Wilson’s confession in court.  Sharon Cohen, Murder Verdict Sealed by Silence, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at 12. 
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Carolina State Bar for violating the attorney-client privilege, the bar 
ultimately threw out the complaint.135  Professor Abbe Smith notes, 
[I]n the rare case where it is truly necessary to disclose information obtained through 
the lawyer-client relationship (to stop the wrong person from being executed, to 
prevent premeditated murder, to prevent mayhem), a lawyer will do so 
notwithstanding the principle, and . . . the lawyer will not be disciplined for it.136 
This suggests that disciplinary committees are likely to avoid penalizing 
lawyers in the most egregious cases—which, under a discretionary rule (and 
perhaps, even a mandatory rule based on Levin’s study), may be the only 
time lawyers would come forward anyway. 
Even so, it is hard to gauge how many lawyers do not come forward 
strictly because a rule does not exist.  Although there is some evidence that 
a rule does not necessarily produce lawyer disclosure, it is unclear how 
many lawyers remain silent because of fear of discipline or sanction.  This 
is particularly true for lawyers who would come forward in cases where an 
innocent person served time in jail for a short period, if a rule existed.  In 
those cases, the threat of discipline, or of hurting one’s reputation, may be 
more severe.  A rule that would allow or require attorneys to come forward 
in such a situation may reduce that threat.  Then again, the history of 
Massachusetts’s experience certainly casts doubt on the reliability of a rule 
to change attorney conduct.  Whether or not a rule necessarily results in 
change, however, there is value in creating a rule as an assertion of the 
principles we believe are important, and as a declaration of the rights 
lawyers should have (whether or not they choose to exercise those rights) if 
they have confidential information that would exonerate an innocent 
inmate. 
G.  THE BENEFITS OF A NEW DISCRETIONARY RULE 
Public response to wrongful incarcerations and executions reflects 
deep resentment and disapproval of this very serious flaw in the judicial 
system.137  In addition to DNA testing, which helps exonerate the innocent, 
a wrongful incarceration exception could add another safeguard for 
innocent men and women.138  The media explosion and the subsequent 
public disgust with Alton Logan’s twenty-six-year incarceration139 suggest 
that the public would favor an exception.  Although there are various issues 
 
135 Paul Woolverton, Bar Lets Lawyer Keep License, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Feb. 12, 
2008, at B1. 
136 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 154. 
137 See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 124, at 46-49. 
138 Id. at 49. 
139 See, e.g., Miner, supra note 2. 
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involved in introducing an exception, the public’s outrage is certainly a 
factor to consider in the decision to promulgate a new rule, since after all, 
lawyers’ ultimate purpose is to represent the public.140 
Several proposals have already been presented.  Professor Miller’s 
contribution—the reinterpretation of the substantial bodily harm exception 
discussed above in Part III.B—certainly raises valuable and significant 
considerations.141  His strongest argument comes through the Model Rules’ 
assertion that the prevention of substantial bodily harm is a concern that 
overrides confidentiality.142  However, his argument overlooks the fact that 
the substantial bodily harm exception is simply not designed to protect the 
wrongfully incarcerated.  In those situations where wrongful incarceration 
does not include substantial bodily harm, or where lawyers simply cannot 
gauge with reasonable certainty whether a prisoner would be subjected to 
bodily harm, the substantial bodily harm exception would not help.  
Additionally, the wording of the substantial bodily harm exception does not 
accommodate the wrongful incarceration situation, as it places no limitation 
on the identity of the person harmed, such that placing one’s client in jail in 
place of the innocent actually violates the rule.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, judges simply have not interpreted the substantial bodily harm 
exception to include a wrongful incarceration exception, and, in the absence 
of specific legislative action to protect the wrongfully incarcerated, it is 
unlikely that judges will add new meaning to the rule. 
Another proposal was suggested by Criminal Justice Section Ethics, 
Gideon & Professionalism Committee co-chairs Bruce Green and Ellen 
Yaroshevsky.143  Their proposal to amend Model Rule 1.6 allows disclosure 
of confidential information in cases of a wrongful conviction only if an 
attorney’s client is already deceased: “[a] lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation of a deceased client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary to prevent or rectify the wrongful conviction 
of another.”144  The drafters recognized the difficulty in allowing disclosure 
before a client’s death; as noted in the comment to the proposed rule, “[t]he 
interests underlying the confidentiality obligation are usually paramount in 
the case of living clients because clients will not be as forthcoming if there 
is a risk that their confidences will be disclosed during their lifetimes.”145  
However, the drafters add, “the societal interest in disclosure may be 
paramount when the client is deceased, particularly when the client’s 
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reputation and estate will not be prejudiced by disclosure.”146  Green and 
Yaroshevsky’s proposal reflects a movement forward in the wake of the 
Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt cases, but their proposed exception 
would do nothing to prevent people in similar situations from serving years-
long sentences before the true criminals died.  While closing the door on 
some issues, their proposal leaves significant concerns unanswered. 
Legislatures should adopt a wrongful incarceration exception to 
attorney-client confidentiality that is available to attorneys even before a 
client’s death.  The values involved in freeing the innocent from undeserved 
prison sentences should be recognized as too weighty to overlook even in 
the face of the long revered benefits of confidentiality.  Incarceration robs 
innocent people of their freedom, exposes them so often to disease and 
physical violence, and diminishes their ability to lead meaningful lives.  
Incarcerating the innocent goes against the very goals implicit in a judicial 
system—to punish wrongdoers, impose order, and establish justice.  A 
wrongful incarceration exception should be promulgated as an assertion of 
society’s values in preserving the freedom of the innocent. 
Though not a solution to all of the issues raised in this Comment, the 
best rule is one that would allow lawyers the discretion to disclose 
confidential information of a wrongful incarceration.  A discretionary rule 
would allow an attorney to decide when to come forward during a 
proceeding—whether pretrial, mid-trial, or after conviction—balancing the 
possible financial and bodily harm imposed on the innocent throughout the 
course of a proceeding and the harm caused to his client by disclosure.  
Similarly, a discretionary rule would allow an attorney to decide whether to 
come forward with confidential information even when it would save an 
innocent from serving just a short sentence.  
Ultimately, disclosing information early in a proceeding or saving an 
innocent defendant from serving a very short sentence, could result in grave 
consequences to the defense attorney’s reputation and client loyalty and 
trust.  Recognizing that disclosing each and every time a wrongful 
incarceration was presented could chill discussions with their clients over 
time, attorneys may use their discretion in choosing to disclose only when 
the benefits of disclosure are significant.  At the same time, coming forward 
too late could result in the media backlash that Coventry, Kunz, and Hughes 
faced (though, it is unclear whether their professional careers have been 
impacted by their decision to keep confidences for so long), and perhaps 
most importantly, could weigh heavily on lawyers’ consciences.  Since 
there is some evidence that clients do not know or understand the 
exceptions to confidentiality, and assume anyway that attorneys will 
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disclose information if they feel morally compelled to do so, a new rule for 
wrongful incarcerations may not chill discussions at all.  However, to the 
extent that it would chill discussions or destroy confidences, a discretionary 
rule would regulate such decisions by forcing attorneys to take into 
consideration the effect on their client before coming forward with 
confidences.  Although a mandatory disclosure rule would make a decision 
to disclose easier, and could promote consistency in lawyers’ response to 
wrongful incarcerations, it would ultimately detract from the values at stake 
while making a very complicated decision a black-and-white one.  A 
discretionary rule gives attorneys the opportunity to fully respect the issues 
at stake and decide the best route. 
Giving attorneys discretion to disclose is not a foreign concept in the 
ethical guidelines.  The current exceptions to confidentiality in the Model 
Rules afford an attorney great leeway in the decision to disclose 
confidential information.  The exceptions allowing attorneys to reveal 
information concerning future crimes “have been given very broad 
discretion with virtually no definition of the provisions’ terms and 
scope.”147  The Massachusetts rule allowing disclosure to prevent “the 
wrongful execution or incarceration of another” provides no guidance as to 
when an attorney should come forward.148  Such discretion suggests that 
attorneys, in the end, are in the best position to regulate such decisions.  
Although the Massachusetts rule has produced no disclosures so far, the 
lack of disclosure could simply signify that lawyers are weighing the issues 
at stake against disclosure.  Such a decision should not necessarily be 
discounted as wrong.  In fact, even Alton Logan, who served so many years 
in prison for a crime Andrew Wilson committed, claimed upon his release 
that “Andrew Wilson’s attorney did nothing wrong.  They did their job.”149  
Attorney-client confidentiality may in fact be that important to the legal 
profession, and even the wrongfully incarcerated understand that. 
The American judicial system does not generally impose a duty on 
attorneys to come forward with evidence in cases where they are not 
representing any parties.150  In fact, more broadly speaking, there is no 
general obligation for persons to report crimes.151  Although lawyers have 
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assumed certain responsibilities as advocates before the law, “they have 
hardly agreed to become law enforcement officers.”152  Requiring lawyers 
to come forward regardless of the effects on their client would cause a 
fundamental shift in the legal profession.  Legal representation should 
always allow an attorney to consider, at the very least, the possible negative 
effects of his actions on his client before disclosing confidences.  Without 
allowing such space for client consideration, lawyers would become yet 
another actor in the law enforcement system, and client representation 
would ultimately suffer. 
Regardless of the form a wrongful incarceration exception takes—
whether discretionary or mandatory—if an attorney does come forward, use 
immunity should be employed to safeguard a client’s constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination.  Thus, any information that was revealed against 
the client’s wishes could not be used against him in a court of law.  Of 
course, an attorney’s disclosure could not prevent a client from being 
prosecuted when existing information about him would be enough to 
prosecute him, but an attorney could still more comfortably reveal 
confidences knowing some safeguards were available.  More importantly, a 
client’s constitutional rights would be protected. 
A discretionary rule certainly has drawbacks, but it is the best option to 
handle the numerous competing interests involved.  Any black letter law 
that sets in stone when, if, and under what circumstances an attorney should 
come forward would not take into account all of the values at stake.  A 
discretionary rule with few exacting constraints is the only option that 
would reflect the gravity of issues presented.  Inherent in a discretionary 
rule is the possibility that lawyers will choose not to come forward, but it is 
a price that many jurisdictions with similar discretionary rules to prevent 
substantial bodily harm and imminent death already choose to pay in order 
to ensure that clients are given effective representation.  Similarly, it is a 
price worth paying in the case of wrongful incarcerations. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Wrongful incarcerations are one of the most tragic products of a 
judicial system.  Often, they are impossible to avoid as judges and juries 
imposing punishment are exposed to only so much information and are, 
after all, only human.  But when exonerating information is available and 
wrongful incarcerations continue to occur, there is a sharp sense of failure 
in the system.  Although lawyers are trained to serve clients, bound by 
confidentiality restraints to preserve their innermost secrets, it seems that 
some secrets are simply too costly to bear.  Saving the innocent from 
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serving time in prison is a value that deserves recognition in the law in spite 
of the recognized benefits of attorney-client confidentiality. 
Still, the issues involved in breaking confidentiality to save the 
wrongfully incarcerated are complex.  Clients arguably should not be 
penalized for revealing incriminating information to their attorneys—
information that they would have kept hidden if it were not for a promise of 
confidentiality.  A wrongful incarceration exception could thus chill the 
very discussions that contribute to an attorney’s knowledge of exonerating 
information.  Adding yet another exception to confidentiality could silence 
clients when their honesty and openness are most important.  In fact, 
without knowing a client’s full story, an attorney may be prevented from 
providing the effective assistance clients so need. 
In addition to the dangers presented by an exception to attorney-client 
confidentiality, a wrongful incarceration exception raises issues involved in 
the timing of disclosure.  When is the right time to disclose and should 
disclosure happen regardless of the sentence imposed?  Is freeing the 
innocent an overriding value in every circumstance, regardless of the effect 
on a client—and on legal assistance as a whole?  This Comment suggests 
that such value judgments are best left to attorneys representing their 
clients.  A discretionary rule for wrongful incarceration disclosures is the 
best option that allows for the most recognition of the values at stake.  By 
allowing attorneys to weigh the issues presented before disclosing, clients’ 
rights are recognized, while the innocent are still provided some hope of 
recourse in the law.  In recognition of the lives of innocent men and women 
serving in prisons, states should adopt a discretionary wrongful 
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